I wrote this up real quick and haven’t gotten around to cleaning it up yet. Some say cucumbers taste better pickled.
House of Representatives
1 per area/domain/subject/”purview (i.e. defense, economy,
Identification committee of domain*
1) A) reps are elected through approval voting
1) B) the number of approvals === fuel
1) b) 1) election process
1) G) delegated actions
1) G) 0) voting on bills that fall in their purview.
1) C periodic election through ‘n-r’ rounds of single vote plurality rules. There are ‘n-c’ delegates per committee c~~r. Incents parties, but hopefully not 2 party convergence. They elected delegates are the ones with the highest CUMULATIVE score ‘cumulative multi round single vote plurality rules system’
[Constitutional vs. civil vs. economic issues vs. protection (exclude foreign affairs) to allow mixed messages (one house of reps, 1 committee of trustees per purview). One super committee of regional purview that can su8imitt bills to house]
[Propose bills, pass bills, veto bills
l-[issues have different payouts to every citizen]
supplier of last resort, ID’s and monitors elections consist of MODIFYING distribution of rates, not so much start from square zero, meaning that abstaining from an election is equivalent to keeping the same allegiances]
Market monitors – veto not delegation of executive authority. So, governmental bodies committees of trustees – submits legislation house of reps passes legislation judiciary – monitors markets and has veto power
Executive – controls markets
[Vote for hose removal buy identified as candidate by function four defining variables of an election structure
Example: legislation: sl4elected as candidate = trustee-ies voted for – House of Representatives removed by judiciary
Functionality – executive
[
2) F) vetoing a constitutional change involves an iterative process of removal of constitutional trustees and re-election of any commi9tte reps, judiciary body (icli9ding itself) my, or citizens, everyone but executives may propose amendment. Voters are constitutional trustees. They also serve as a committee manager, but any action taken by committee is considered an amendment. Veto may also be done by as super-majority of a popular vote
1) E) represenat5iatives may at any time put themselves up for re-fueling but at a cost = # of abstinences (?)(Number of times that a representative has abstained from voting) set to zero – (n-a) – a minority issue c may vote infrequently, but if he has a solid set of supporters, he’s cool. Costs 1 fuel point to go up for re-fueling. 1) Should be done
2. Z) committ4ees
2. A) proposed by constitutional committee
2. B) need non-partisanship
One approval and j1 veto (?)
Multiporoved super to elect. N-r = ne-c
Next, veto round. IFF your vote is not5 an elected candidate, you may tag on a veto (for electing another candidate in the next iteration, I think… 2TTT).
Fixed vote multi round super in electing rounds, if you have a winning candidate, you can’t participate (or is n-c dependant on percent of citizens = electorate NOT represented? Sure, why not)
n- for committees
n- for representatives
n-c for number of committees
n-r for representatives
Max term of a representative
Percent for vote agreement
Voting system for committees’
Voting system for judiciary
Executives
[If time between rounds is large enough and/or votes by the elected takes place, a voter that has a winning vote may change it, but then that candidate may be disposed.]
Game theoretic Description:
Value flavor === {actual value |, perceived value |, expect value |}
A cast vote has value and expected value, but is vote is public, not private, and then there exists perceived value. Therefore open vote is just special case where the perceived value| === actual value |
1TT:
Action/Behavior set
Value/payout set
What aboue sett
What settings? ~~~rules, but also terrain/context
Setting operator is of the form S|Asubt = Asub t+1 (iff time is discrete)
Dido for value set?
Who affects what???
===separation lf powers is equivalent to making the setting operator to be sparse matrix at time constant action allows for justification of setting operator as a matrix
S actions on a-vector(??? Notes illegible) = v-prime-vector () assuming player set is constant)
A zero on the diagonal implies an ‘orthogonal payout’ meaning that any given player’s action does not affect the play insubejt whice is nice.
That is the whole point of citizen’s affect gov’t (mainly are those players that comprise it), but not each other. To make it TRULY an orthogonal payout game, gov’t officials need to be denied their right to vote. Of course resignation is always possible, so it is like an option on affecting the setting operator for the government at any given time.
Prescott
v.1.0
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